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SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE* By Alan Watson. Edinburgh: 
Scottish Academic Press. 1977. Pp. xi, 148. £3.75. 
Most contemporary American legal historians agree that post-
Revolutionary American society shaped and was shaped by evolving 
rules of private law.1 Morton Horwitz, for example, argues that an-
tebellum judges aggressively manipulated common-law doctrines to 
promote commercial development and to direct power and wealth to 
emerging entrepreneurial and commercial groups.2 More specifi-
cally, the legal establishment modified private law to facilitate the 
transfer of capital and credit, reduce the liability of sellers, and de-
crease the vulnerability of employers.3 
Alan Watson's engaging 150-page book rejects this view of legal 
development. Instead, it marvels that Western societies for centuries 
supported systems of private law that remain hopelessly out of step 
with the needs and aspirations of their citizens, particularly those of 
their dominant classes. For Watson, archaic rules of private law en-
dure by the grace of inertia in legal reform and society's remarkable 
tolerance for the irrational. Watson draws freely from his encyclo-
pedic knowledge of Western legal traditions for evidence to support 
his thesis. And, not surprisingly, he relies heavily on his earlier 
work. The :finished product is crisp and engaging. 
The first two thirds of Society and Legal Change analyzes rules of 
private law ''which serve neither the interests of society at large or 
its ruling class nor the interests of anyone else" (p. 6). Watson de-
votes several chapters to various aspects of Roman contract, prop-
erty, and family law. The concept of patria potestas - the power of 
a father over his descendants - kept children from owning property 
and made commercial arrangements cumbersome. In the author's 
view, it is an excellent example of a legal rule that remained on the 
books long after it had become "wildly out of step both with the 
needs of the society and the life-style of the society, its leaders in-
* This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review - Ed. 
l. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); M. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDI-
TIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); L. LEVY, THE 
LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957); W. NELSON, AMERICANIZA-
TION OF THE COMMON LAW (1975). 
2. See M. HORWITZ, supra note l, at xv-xvi and passim. 
3. See, e.g., M. HORWITZ, supra note I; W. NELSON, supra note l. Judge Lemuel Shaw, for 
example, introduced the "fellow servant rule," which eliminated the liability of an employer 
for workers injured as the result of fellow workers' negligence. See L. LEVY, supra note l, at 
ch. IO. Judges also applied notions of co=on-law conspiracy to prosecute nascent labor 
unions. See id at ch. l l. For an excellent collection of early labor decisions, see A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (J. Co=ons and G. Gilmore, eds. 1958). 
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eluded" (p. 29).4 Watson next studies the English law of future inter-
ests, title registration, defamation, and felony /misdemeanor 
distinctions, finding that private legal rules in these areas also failed 
to keep pace with social change. For example, England still has not 
adopted a system of compulsory title registration even though the 
benefits of such a system have been clearly demonstrated and the 
existing land conveyancing system is expensive and needlessly com-
plex. 
Watson draws several lessons from the private law's failure to 
meet the needs of society and its ruling elite. His foremost concern is 
that there is no effective mechanism to rationalize and modernize 
private law. He finds legislatures overburdened and too sensitive to 
the pressures of special interest groups. On the other hand, he finds 
judges' authority too limited to permit them to indulge in compre-
hensive law reform. Forced to follow irrational statutory and prece-
dential mandates, judges must make legal rules more technical and 
obscure in order to moderate their undesirable effects - a process 
Watson dubs "legal scaffolding." He concludes that a case can "be 
made out for the proposition that it would be beneficial to have a law 
making body intermediate between the courts and the legislature; 
with greater and more systematic powers of law making than courts 
have, but not subject to the political pressures experienced by legisla-
tures" (p. 133).5 
In his final chapter, Watson prescribes a program for investiga-
ting the causes of legal development: "[A] particular country 
[should] be studied for a considerable period of its history during 
which it underwent marked changes in its circumstances whether so-
cial, economic, political, or religious. One should then look at its 
private law to see how quickly, if at all, the legal rules did in general 
respond to the change in society" (p. 140). Yet, as noted above, sev-
eral prominent historians have conducted such an investigation of 
private law in nineteenth-century America.6 Their unanimous con-
clusion that private-law rules were closely interwoven with the needs 
and aspirations of nineteenth-century society (or a dominant seg-
4. In practice, the harsh effects of patria poles/as were mitigated through emancipatio (a 
ceremony that artificially ended the patria poles/as) and the pecu/ium (a fund that the father set 
aside for those in his poles/as) (pp. 24-25). 
5. Such bodies may already exist de facto in the United Kingdom in the English and Scot-
tish Law Commissions (p. 136), and in the United States in the American Law Institute and 
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Yet Watson's criticism of judges is equally appli-
cable to his proposed intermediate body of elite law-makers: 
The power of the interpreters to reform the law or keep it static is, despite everything, 
considerable. These interpreters will form a small group within a society - indeed, a 
small group even among lawyers - and their views need not correspond to society as a 
whole. Loyalty to the group or to a wider circle of lawyers may deform the law further. 
P. 121. Moreover, the political ramifications of vesting such substantial law-making powers in 
a body immune from "political pressures" are considerable. 
6. See, e.g., M. HORWITZ, supra note l; J. HURST, supra note I; W. NELSON, supra note 1. 
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ment of that society7) raises doubts about whether Watson's thesis (if 
valid) is applicable to legal institutions on this side of the Atlantic. 
The opposite conclusions of Watson and the American historians 
might reflect different evidentiary emphasis. The American histori-
ans focused their attention on those aspects of private law closely 
related to commercial development - negotiable instruments, con-
tracts, employer-employee relations, and torts. Watson's main con-
cern, in contrast, is with private law in general. As a broad 
proposition, his contention that legal rules often endure long after 
they cease to benefit society or its dominant classes is well docu-
mented. But in the specific sphere of post-Roman8 commercial law, 
the evidence seems to be on the other side. Had he been careful to 
limit his thesis to noncommercial private law, Watson might have 
escaped the need to confront the American evidence. 
It may be, however, that the divergence between Watson and the 
American historians has a more structural cause: the uniquely im-
portant role of judges in the American legal process. Chief Justice 
Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the most prolific 
of all American judges, sought to explain the unusually creative role 
that judges played in nineteenth-century jurisprudence: 
It is one of the great merits and advantages of the common law, that, 
instead of a series of detailed practical rules, established by positive 
provisions . . . the common law consists of a few broad and compre-
hensive principles, founded on reason, natural justice, and enlightened 
public policy . . . . These general principles of equity and policy are 
rendered precise by ... usage [and] judicial exposition .... 9 
Whether or not one approves of Shaw's heuristic theory, his pic-
ture of the innovative jurist seems to fit well with our knowledge of 
the colonial experience. Lacking law books and technical training, 
the early American legal community developed an organic concep-
tion of law that lacked sharp distinctions between common law, cus-
tom, and community standards.10 Unlike the hierarchical British 
7. For Hurst, nineteenth-century law evolved in response to a broad consensus of goals 
and values in American society; for Horwitz, it evolved in response to the desires of the domi-
nant commercial classes, which he perceived to be in conflict with the interests of other seg-
ments of society. See M. HORWITZ, supra note I; J. HURST, supra note I. 
8. Watson does consider aspects of the Roman commercial law of contract and novation. 
Because of the paucity of evidence regarding the values and aspirations of Roman society and 
its ruling elite, it is difficult to determine the correlation between important rules of commer-
cial law and the desires of commercial and entrepreneurial groups. In addition, Watson sug-
gests that Roman jurists disregarded the relation of law and "extra-legal" matters, a 
phenomenon, that if true, contrasts sharply with nineteenth-century American jurisprudence 
(pp. 44, 46 n.48). 
9. Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263, 267 (1854). 
10. See 1 D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS 199-205 (1958). In his important study oflegal 
development in Plymouth colony, Julius Goebel concludes that English legal doctrines were 
rarely received without substantial modification into American legal institutions: 
Local custom, substantive as the Winchester measure, pretentious as the notion of the 
code, ineradicable as the methods of law administration, fortuitous as a form of tenure; 
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legal system, colonial courts combined the rules of admiralty, bor-
ough, manor, and often equity in their effort to discover principles of 
justice appropriate to the new society. The level of experimentation 
in colonial courts was so high that the English provincial govern-
ments became alarmed; the General Court of Massachusetts, for one, 
published a "Declaration" designed to establish congruity between 
Massachusetts and English law. 11 Significantly, however, the Decla-
ration discussed only public law. Throughout the colonial and Rev-
olutionary periods, the dearth of law digests and the lay character of 
the legal community may have made judicial "creativity" inevitable. 
[A]lthough English authorities were cited constantly, they appear to 
have expanded rather than restricted judicial discretion. Because of 
the very perplexities of colonial law the judges were free, indeed were 
driven, to select and to innovate in order to adjust continually to local 
circumstances. "I never presumed to call myself a Lawyer," wrote 
Thomas Hutchinson of his experiences as Chief Justice of the Massa-
chusetts Superior Court from 1760-69. "The most I could pretend to 
was when I heard the Law laid on both sides to judge what was 
right."12 
Thus, American judges, unlike their counterparts in England and 
South Africa, 13 may have been free to fashion rules of private law 
appropriate to American soil, borrowing from other systems only 
when helpful. If the American judiciary was indeed an effective 
mechanism for the systematic modernization of private law,14 Wat-
son's thesis would seem unsuited to this country's experience. 
Society and Legal Change is an important contribution to the his-
toriography of legal development; students of private law must con-
sider the important questions Watson raises regarding scaffolding 
and the potential for systematic law reform. Substantial additional 
investigation is necessary to determine the extent to which private 
bitter experience at the hands of a zealous bishop and his pursuivants, or a stony-hearted 
evicting landlord; hope and salvation in the Word of God preached by word or pamphlet, 
these things are the materials that went with settlers to Plymouth and out of which their 
law was fashioned. 
Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 CoLUM, L. 
REV. 416,447 (1931). 
11. See A JJec/aralion of the General Court holden al Boston 4(9) 1646, reprinted in, A COL-
LECTION OF ORIGINAL PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHU• 
SETTS-BAY 196 (f. Hutchinson ed. 1769). 
12. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 297 (1969). 
13. The South African judges Watson refers to seem particularly obsessed with tracing 
legal doctrines back through history to their English, Roman-Dutch, and Justinian roots. In 
fact one judge relied on some thirty medieval juristic authorities (finally reaching a statute 
written circa 287 B.C.) in order to determine the "correct" rule regarding an owner's liability 
for damage caused by his dog in the absence of negligence on the part of the owner (pp. 82-83), 
14. See generally M. HORWil'Z, supra note I; L. LEVY, supra note l; W. NELSON, supra 
note 1. It is instructive to note that Watson does not analyze the opinions of Lord Mansfield, 
the eighteenth-century British jurist whose transformation of English commercial law to reflect 
laissez-faire business doctrines presaged the efforts of Shaw and other American judges. 
March 1980) Society and Legal Change 833 
law is out of step with the needs and desires of society generally, and 
especially the extent to which private law fails to mirror the interests 
of the dominant classes of society. It is surely no longer possible for 
le1?;al historians to assert, without qualification or substantial evi-
dence, that "[t]he material content of a legal system has always 
been seen to reflect in some sense the needs or demands of societies. 
"15 
15. P. 1 (quoting G. SAWER, LAW IN SOCIETY 147 (1965)). 
